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A B S T R A C T
It has been estimated that European customers visit community pharmacies to access essential primary
healthcare around 46 million times every day. Studies of dispensing error rates in community pharmacies have
reported error rates of between 0.08% and 3.3% per item dispensed. While severe cases of dispensing in-
accuracies often garner a high level of media coverage, less significant errors are also causing inefficiencies in
primary healthcare delivery. If a variety of dispensing protocols and their consequences could be analysed using
a modelling tool, the results would form the evidence for decisions on best practice guidelines in order to
improve patient safety and pharmacy efficiency.
This paper presents a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) modelling technique for analysing the reliability and effi-
ciency of a community pharmacy dispensing process. The proposed approach is a novel method for considering
reliability and efficiency in a single simulation based model. The CPN model represents how a team of practi-
tioners work together to complete a set of tasks carried out in community pharmacies. It describes a close-to-
reality dispensing process, which evaluates pharmacy performance over a number of key performance indicators
of process reliability and efficiency, and records how staff distribute their time between tasks. Where possible,
results are validated against published studies of community pharmacies.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The last two decades have seen a growing awareness of iatrogenic
patient safety issues within healthcare systems. Reports by the US
Institute of Medicine [37] and the UK Department of Health [17] pro-
vided evidence of clear patient safety issues. These seminal reports were
focused on patient safety issues occurring in secondary care settings,
such as hospitals. However, the issue of patient safety in primary care
has become of high priority for the World Health Organization (WHO),
which identified pharmacies as a priority primary care area for im-
proving patient safety [56]. There is a growing school of thought within
the healthcare community that their attitude to risk should mirror the
practices seen in other high risk industries [47]. In the UK, demand
from the public on community pharmacy services is continuing to grow,
for example, the Office for National Statistics recently reported that
1.106 billion prescriptions were dispensed in 2017, a 0.2% increase on
the previous year [44]. Previous studies of dispensing error rates in
community pharmacies have reported error rates of between 0.08%
[10] and 3.3% [24] per item dispensed, which suggests nationwide
errors could total up to 36,432,000 per year. The variability between
these findings can be attributed to a number of factors, although a key
one to consider is the methodology of data collection. Studies using
external examination to detect errors returned higher error rates than
those using self-report based methodologies [6]. Furthermore, since
evaluations of error detection methodologies have shown that all error
detection techniques underestimate the true number of errors [22], 36
million errors per year may be an underestimate.
As well as ensuring patient safety, community pharmacies operate
in a competitive marketplace. There are over 11,000 pharmacies in
England, with 40% of stores being located in clusters, where three or
more pharmacies are within a 10 min walk of each other [18]. To en-
courage customers to return to use the same pharmacy repeatedly,
pharmacies must offer a high quality service and meet customer re-
quirements [14]. Patient satisfaction with pharmacy services has been
shown to be closely related to waiting times [1], and long waiting times
have been given as a reason for why patients will not return to a par-
ticular pharmacy [52].
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2018.09.022
Received 4 May 2018; Received in revised form 21 September 2018; Accepted 28 September 2018
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: matthew.naybour@nottingham.ac.uk (M. Naybour).
Reliability Engineering and System Safety 182 (2019) 258–268
Available online 03 October 2018
0951-8320/ Crown Copyright © 2018 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
1.2. Reliability engineering
Reliability engineering techniques have been used to manage risk in
a wide range of fields, such as the aviation, space, nuclear and chemical
industries [3] [40] [29] [26]. There is an established collection of re-
liability engineering techniques capable of performing system failure
analyses [2]. For example, fault and event trees are commonly used
reliability engineering techniques, dating back to 1961, when they were
first used to study the Minuteman missile launch system [8]; NASA
further promoted the technique with the publication of their fault tree
handbook in 2002 [54]. Fault trees are a combinatorial method which
relies on an assumption that the occurrence of basic events is in-
dependent. Markov models are an effective technique for modelling
systems containing repairable components, dynamic operation, and
general behaviour which cannot be modelled using simpler methods
[9]. However, a limitation in their use comes from the fact that Markov
systems grow exponentially with the number of system states, making
them unsuitable for the analysis of large and complex systems. Petri
nets, first seen in 1962 and named after their inventor Carl Adam Petri
[43], have proved to be a highly effective way of modelling systems
containing concurrent processes [51]. Since their inception, a number
of extensions of the basic technique have been introduced to expand
upon the modelling power of basic place transition nets. For example,
timed nets control the firing of transitions using deterministic or sto-
chastic periods of time, allowing Petri nets to represent temporal pro-
cesses. Another extension (the technique used in this paper), Coloured
Petri nets, introduces colour sets to tokens, enabling the transmission of
token specific information around the net [30]. Coloured Petri nets
have been used to model complex concurrent processes in a number of
fields [33,34].
Healthcare is a relatively new field of application for reliability
engineering. Where work has been done, secondary health care settings,
such as hospitals, have been the common setting [12,20]. In primary
care, Cohen et al. [11] made use of fault and event trees, to perform a
socio-technical probabilistic risk assessment of the dangers involved in
dispensing high-alert medications in community pharmacies. This
paper presented a table of human error probabilities for basic tasks,
derived from a variety of techniques such as the SPAR-H human re-
liability analysis method [27], and the THERP technique for human
reliability analysis [53]. Petri nets have also been used to model sec-
ondary healthcare services to analyse system performance in terms of
resource efficiency, and ability to deal with increased patient demands
[15,19,58]. Similarly, secondary healthcare settings have been the
focus of Coloured Petri net modelling approaches [5,13,48]. Previous
Coloured Petri Net modelling work based in healthcare settings has
focused on either the detailed variations in a process which can affect
outcomes, or a macro scale analysis of how best to manage a whole
healthcare unit. These approaches have led to different forms of results,
such as the rate of failure of a process [48], or the efficiency of a de-
livery strategy [5]. This paper aims to address both issues by modelling
the individual dispensing process being completed by practitioners, and
evaluating the overall performance of the pharmacy. Reliability en-
gineering techniques can be well suited to the requirements of model-
ling healthcare processes [35], however, there are some key challenges
facing a reliability engineer, specifically when modelling healthcare
processes. These include the unavailability of failure data, complexities
in representing human actors, and reliance on the testimony of experts,
which may be biased [57].
This paper proposes a timed Coloured Petri net modelling tech-
nique, as a tool for modelling the community pharmacy dispensing
process. The novelty of this approach is the ability to perform the
evaluation of process reliability and efficiency in a single simulation-
based model. This paper presents the proposed modelling approach, the
rules for the CPN model development, and illustrates the diversity of
performance indicators that can be obtained from the model. This ap-
proach advances the current techniques due to its ability to evaluate the
dispensing process in two dimensions: the system’s ability to process
prescriptions under various resource constraints and patient demands,
and the reliability of the process. It extends the previous publications by
the authors [38,39] through the usage of the CPN features to model a
number of staff members performing the same type of activities by a
single subnet with concurrent transitions. The remainder of the paper
has the following structure: Section 2 outlines the standard community
pharmacy dispensing process, Section 3 presents the modelling ap-
proach, Section 4 shows results and analysis of the model, and Section 5
provides a conclusion to the paper.
2. The community pharmacy dispensing process
2.1. The main stages of dispensing
A typical community pharmacy dispensing process is presented in
this section. Fig. 1 shows the six keys stages of the dispensing process
[32,41,55]. In this process, a prescription can begin moving through the
pharmacy after the prescription is handed in (either in person or elec-
tronically), where it is received by a member of staff. While receiving
prescriptions, a legal check is performed, to make sure the prescription
is legal to dispense. Then the labels, containing important information
on how medicines are to be used, are generated. Labels used to be hand
written, although in modern pharmacies label production is semi-au-
tomated with some data checking and entry where necessary. For ex-
ample, some details, including the instructions for use and dose re-
gimen, must be selected from drop-down menus on a computer screen.
The Royal Pharmaceutical Society [49] provide a summary of the in-
formation which must be included on a label:
1. Patient name
2. Address of the pharmacy
3. Date the medicine was dispensed
4. Drug name
5. Instructions for use
6. Quantity of medicine
7. Concentration/strength
8. Any cautions or extra instructions
Once the labels have been made, the items contained in the pre-
scriptions are collected together, after which the labels are attached
onto the corresponding medicine boxes. Once the assembly is complete,
the finished prescription is passed onto a pharmacist or an appro-
priately qualified Accredited Checking Technician (ACT), who performs
a final accuracy check. This check is designed to be the final failsafe of
the dispensing process, and its purpose is to ensure a match between the
prescription form and the prescription being prepared. If no dis-
crepancies between the form and the assembled prescription are found,
the assembled prescription is handed over to the patient (or placed into
a box to be delivered later).
A further clinical check must be performed on the prescription to
make sure the medicine being dispensed is clinically appropriate for the
patient. This check may technically happen at any point in the process,
although it is common for pharmacists to perform a clinical check in
Fig. 1. Dispensing process flow chart.
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tandem with the final accuracy check.
Errors are to be identified and rectified at the final check, and any
errors that are found should be recorded as a near miss for use in future
analysis of the failure [55]. Meanwhile, any failures that go unspotted
at the final accuracy check are likely to reach the patient.
Each stage of the dispensing process may be completed by a single
member of the pharmacy staff team. The only restriction is that only
pharmacists or ACTs, are qualified to complete the final accuracy check.
The order of task completion follows Fig. 1 in the model, however, in
practice the order of generating labels and picking medicines may be
switched, and the clinical check may be completed independently of the
final accuracy check at any point in the process by a qualified phar-
macist.
2.2. Resources
A pharmacy staff team may contain a number of pharmacists, dis-
pensers, and ACTs. Large pharmacies may have many of each, while a
small pharmacy may have only a single pharmacist. There must always
be a responsible pharmacist present on site for a pharmacy to dispense
prescriptions.
The resources involved in the dispensing process are: prescriptions,
dispensers, pharmacists, medicines, labels, and labelling stations.
Prescriptions can contain a number of medicinal items which must be
gathered together during the assembly stage of dispensing. Note that in
this paper, all analysis is conducted at a prescription level, where a
prescription contains a number of items. The number of items affects
how long a prescription takes to dispense at certain points in the pro-
cess. However, it does not affect error rates.
2.3. Non-dispensing tasks
In addition to completing dispensing tasks, there are also a number
of non-dispensing tasks that pharmacies must complete [16]. The non-
dispensing tasks included in this study are: stock management, patient
counselling and advanced pharmacy services. Patient counselling and
advanced services may only be provided by a pharmacist, whereas all
staff is capable of carrying out stock management tasks.
Stock management involves maintaining the supply of medicines on
the shelves. Patient counselling is done while handing out prescriptions
to patients. Pharmacists must offer verbal advice to the patient or their
representative on how to take medicine in a safe and effective manner
[32]. There are six advanced services offered by pharmacies: the
morning after pill, influenza vaccinations, medicine use reviews,
smoking cessation, appliance use reviews, stoma appliance customiza-
tion and NHS (National Health Service) urgent medicine supply. Ad-
vanced services take a pharmacist away from the dispensing process for
a period of time [45], while they use a privacy room to see to the pa-
tient.
2.4. Failure modes
To provide correct prescriptions for customers in an acceptable
amount of time and do it reliably, are the two main goals of community
pharmacies. Hence, the pharmacy dispensing process can be considered
to fail when:
1. A prescription given/delivered to a patient is incorrect.
2. A prescription takes such a long time to dispense, that distress or
inconvenience is caused to the patient, and the pharmacy becomes
an undesirable choice for return visits.
There are number of ways which prescriptions can be incorrect. For
example, the contents of the prescription may be of the wrong strength,
wrong volume, wrong type of medication, or the wrong pharmaceutical
form (tablets/capsules/inhalers/patches etc.). An error of this kind
would be classified as a content error. Another type of error is a la-
belling error, which occurs when the medicine labels contain an error.
One example is that the label may indicate to take the medicine more
frequently than was prescribed. Finally, the labels may have been
generated correctly so that they match the items, which also match the
prescriber’s intended medication. However, an error can occur if the
labels are applied to mismatching medicine boxes.
2.5. Definitions of process reliability and process efficiency
The reliability of the dispensing process, R, is defined as the pro-
portion of prescriptions dispensed where the outcome is completely
correct, as shown in Eq. (1):=R p p/correct total (1)
where ptotal is the total number of completed prescriptions, and pcorrect is
the number of correct prescriptions.
The efficiency of a process is usually calculated through a compar-
ison between useful outputs and the required resources to sustain the
production. As the cost of resources is not taken into account in this
study, a set of efficiency indicators are used to measure the pharmacies
performance. The indicators use the number of prescriptions com-
pleted, and the time taken to complete them, as the two main measures
of efficiency. The best outcome in terms of efficiency is one which
outputs a large number of prescriptions with each prescription being
completed quickly.
2.6. Definitions of near misses and dispensing errors
Near misses and dispensing errors are two commonly seen cate-
gories in literature, related to capturing the error rate of dispensing in
community pharmacies [4,10,31]. Below there are two typical defini-
tions of near misses and dispensing errors used by Chua et al. [10]:
1. A near miss is defined as an error in the dispensing process that is
identified by the pharmacy staff before the medication is given to a
patient.
2. A dispensing error is an error that is discovered after the prescrip-
tion has been given to a patient.
These definitions are used in the paper to classify the outcome of
prescriptions, with some minor adjustments. In the model, if a pre-
scription is handed over to a patient, or stored for delivery with an error
present, this is counted as a dispensing error. Another implicit differ-
ence between the 2nd definition above and the one used in the model, is
that in the model each error is recorded, whereas in practice, some
dispensing errors might not be discovered. This would happen if a
pharmacy gave a patient the wrong medication, but the patient fails to
notice the error. Finally, note it is possible for a single prescription to
undergo multiple near misses.
3. Modelling approach
3.1. Overview
This section of the paper presents an introduction to Petri Nets, and
demonstrates the development of a Coloured Petri Net (CPN) model for
simulating processes carried out in a community pharmacy, where to-
kens mimic the behaviour of pharmacy staff as they dispense pre-
scriptions, and complete non-dispensing tasks.
3.2. Introduction to Petri nets
Petri nets are executable directed bi-partite graphs. They consist of
two sets of nodes, places and transitions, with arcs running between
these two sets of nodes. Places may contain a number of tokens, which
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are used to govern the firing of transitions, following a firing rule. This
paper uses a Timed Petri Net extension, where delay times can be
random (sampled from any distribution), or deterministic (also equal to
0) [51]. It is similar to the Stochastic Petri Net (SPN) formalism pre-
sented in [7], without the restrictions that only the exponential dis-
tribution may be used, and non-zero deterministic delays can occur, as
in [46].
Fig. 2 shows an example Petri net. The firing rule states that, if all
input places of a transition are marked with at least wi tokens (wi is the
weight of the edge connecting input place to transition), then the
transition is enabled. The transition will fire after time D, equal to the
timing of the transition. If the transition is stochastically timed, D will
be equal to a single sample of time from the probability distribution
attached to the transition. Alternatively, if D is deterministic, it will fire
after the deterministic amount of time specified. Upon firing, a new
marking is generated by reducing the number of tokens on input places
of the transition by wi, and increasing the number of tokens on output
places by wo (the weight of the edges connecting a transition to its
output places).
Once constructed, results can be derived from Petri net models
through Monte Carlo simulation, or in the case where only exponential
random variables are used to control transition timings, Markov
methods can be used to analyse the system [42]. In this paper, since not
only the exponential distribution is used to control the timing of tran-
sitions, all results are derived from Monte Carlo simulations.
3.2.1. Coloured Petri nets
Colours can be added to a Petri net framework. In this paper,
combinations of colour sets are used to define a set of distinct token
types. This paper uses three token types: prescription (p), worker (w),
and basic tokens (e), to represent the resources. The worker (w) token
type has one colour field used to indicate the role of the worker token
(as either dispenser or pharmacist), and a further set of colours which
correspond to the tasks they are allowed to complete. The prescription
token type, (p) uses a larger set of colours, which are described in
Section 3.3.5. Basic tokens (e) have no colour sets attached to them, and
they are used in the PN to permanently enable transitions, model the
availability of labelling stations, and count the number of times a
pharmacist has completed an advanced service.
The firing rule for Coloured Petri nets is similar to that of non-co-
loured nets, although there are additional control mechanisms to take
into account, such as transition guard expressions and arc inscriptions.
Guard expressions can be used to constrain the enabling conditions of
transitions based on the colours of tokens on their input places. Arc
expressions can be used to alter the properties of tokens being placed
onto output places, or the types of tokens needed to enable a transition
on input places. The use of colours in this paper has been inspired by
[30], however, the way time is introduced follows that seen in [51].
Fig. 3 shows an example CPN transition. The expression beside each
place marker indicates the types of tokens contained in each place, and
arc expressions take the form of a multi-set of colours. In the example,
there are two coloured token types, p and w. p tokens include waiting
time as one of their colours, and w tokens have colours that correspond
to time spent completing various tasks. After the transition has fired,
the waiting time and the colour corresponding to the task being com-
pleted, are both incremented by the delay time D. Note that the waiting
time of the p token on place 2, is also incremented.
Introducing token colours into a Petri net framework enables much
more detailed analysis of token behaviour. The colours enable each
token to represent distinct entities, unlike a Petri net without colours,
where two tokens on a single place are always indistinguishable. The
ability to distinguish between tokens allows for a higher level of
modelling resolution, desirable for this community pharmacy applica-
tion.
3.3. Building the model
The model presented in this paper has been designed to simulate a
community pharmacy which uses a manual dispensing method (instead
of the automated method [25]), with the ability to accommodate
variable numbers of pharmacists and dispensers. The staff are capable
of working in parallel to complete prescriptions. Fig. 4 shows the full
graph of the CPN used to model the process. The model was built by
considering how a single prescription moves around a pharmacy, and
then incorporating the way resources are used in dispensing a pre-
scription.
Table 1 lists each place, along with a description of the place, and
the token types that are allowed to occupy each place. Places are used
for different purposes in the net. Some places are used to hold staff
resources, others show at which stage prescriptions are in the dispen-
sing journey. Alternatively, some places are used to generate new tasks,
by keeping a transition constantly enabled (1, 19, 20, and 23). Note that
increments of a constantly enabled exponentially distributed transition
represent a Poisson random variable, used for modelling the arrival of
walk-in patients or advanced services.
Table 2 shows a list of transitions, their distribution used for tran-
sition timings, a small description of what a transition controls, and a
letter Y in the 4th column designates some transitions as processor
transitions (events which are affected by the number of items in a
prescription). For example, generating labels is a processor transition,
since it will take longer to generate a set of labels for a prescription
containing a large number of items.
Some transitions are representative of community pharmacy dis-
pensing tasks (eg. 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12), for example, labelling, filling or
new prescriptions entering the system, while other transitions (3, 5, 9,
13, 17, and 20), are for controlling the way tokens are allocated around
the net, and are not representative of any real task. The latter are used
Fig. 2. An example of a transition firing.
Fig. 3. A coloured Petri net transition.
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to determine which tasks pharmacy staff prioritise. The CPN models a
pharmacy in which people may assemble prescriptions and accuracy
check prescriptions simultaneously. This is a reflection on the relative
size of the pharmacy being modelled. If a specific pharmacy is capable
of having more or less people work simultaneously on similar tasks, the
model is able to accommodate this by limiting the number of self
concurrencies allowed for specific transitions.
Transition timings have been generated through in depth discus-
sions with two experienced community pharmacists. All interviewees
had previous experience working in community pharmacy dispensaries.
The interviews generated the estimates of the mean duration of each
stage, while distribution types have been assumed, for example, use the
Poisson distribution, a common distribution to count arrivals, to de-
scribe patient arrivals.
3.3.1. Model assumptions
A key feature of the model is the distinction between primary and
secondary tasks, as shown in Fig. 4, and between the two types of staff,
dispensers and pharmacists. The model designates each task as either
primary or secondary, where any member of staff may complete pri-
mary tasks, but only pharmacists may complete secondary tasks. As well
as this distinction, the model uses further assumptions about staff be-
haviour, and pharmacy resources. The assumptions about staff beha-
viour are as follows:
• Staff complete tasks in an identical way, i.e. the same probability
distributions are used to determine how long tasks take to complete,
and error probabilities are the same.• Primary dispensing tasks include: receiving prescriptions, gen-
erating labels, assembling prescriptions, applying labels and stock
management. Secondary tasks include: final accuracy checking
prescriptions, completing advanced pharmacy services, handing
prescriptions over to patients (along with patient counselling) and
storing medicines for delivery.• Pharmacists prioritise completing secondary dispensing tasks, but
they may also contribute to completing primary tasks. If a phar-
macist is on place 16 with no secondary tasks to complete, and no
dispensers are in place 6, the pharmacist will instantaneously move
to complete a primary task.
Assumptions about labelling stations, pharmacy opening hours, and
prescriptions, are given below:
• There are 2 labelling stations (A labelling station is a computer
linked to a small printer, capable of producing labels).• When a customer arrives in the pharmacy, the first member of staff
available to complete primary tasks moves over to the counter to
receive the prescription. If multiple staff are available, the member
of staff that has been idle for the longest time receives the pre-
scription.• Once a member of staff begins generating labels for a prescription,
they continue working on the same prescription until the labels have
been applied, i.e. the same person will generate labels, collect the
contents, and apply the labels consecutively.
Fig. 4. A coloured Petri net for modelling community pharmacy dispensing
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• Walk-in prescriptions are prioritised over delivery prescriptions, and
there is a “first come first served” order of completion.• The pharmacy is open from 9am to 5pm.• 150 delivery prescriptions arrive at the pharmacy in a single large
bulk of orders, at 10am, 1 h after the pharmacy opens.• Walk-in prescriptions and advanced services arrive with increments
of exponential distributions.
3.3.2. Resources
Simulations begin with no prescriptions in the pharmacy.
Dispensers and pharmacists are initially placed in places 6 and 16 re-
spectively. The only resource modelled by basic tokens, are the label-
ling stations used to create and print labels. These are represented in
Fig. 4 by the basic tokens on places 7.
3.3.3. Primary task allocation
Staff tokens wait in an ‘available’ place, until a task needs to be
completed. Once a task becomes available, the member of staff who has
been waiting the longest is allocated to complete that task. Fig. 5 is an
enlarged section of Fig. 4, showing workers waiting to be allocated to
various primary tasks.
As tasks arrive, workers are allocated using instantaneous transi-
tions which each has a parameter to determine their order of priority.
The priority parameter controls which task workers are allocated to if
there are multiple tasks needing completion. Fig. 5 shows the allocation
transitions for four primary dispensing tasks which require worker re-
sources (transitions 3, 5, 17 and 20).
The hierarchy of primary tasks from the top priority to the lowest
Table 1
Model places.
Place Description Token Type
1 Walk-in prescription generator. e
2 Customer waiting at counter. e
3 Delivery prescription generator. e
4 Member of staff is on the counter ready to receive a
prescription.
w
5 Prescriptions waiting to be dispensed. p+ e
6 Staff available to complete primary dispensing tasks. w
7 Labelling stations available. e
8 A member of staff is choosing a prescription, to complete
primary tasks.
w
9 A member of staff is generating the labels of a prescription. w+p
10 Staff are assembling, and applying labels to a prescription. w+p
11 Prescriptions waiting for secondary dispensing tasks to be
completed.
p+ e
12 A pharmacist is allocated to complete secondary tasks for a
prescription.
w
13 Pharmacist is completing a final accuracy check. w+p
14 Pharmacist is handing over medicines to a patient/storing a
delivery for collection later.
w+p
15 All completed prescriptions. p
16 Pharmacists available to complete secondary dispensing
tasks.
w
17 Advanced service being completed. w
18 Advanced service waiting to be completed. e
19 Advanced services task generator. e
20 Stocking task generator. e
21 Stocking task waiting to be completed. e
22 Stocking task being completed. w
23 Dispenser lunch break generator. e
24 Lunch break is ready to be taken. e
25 A dispenser is on their lunch break. w
26 Arrivals counter. w
27 Advanced services counter.
Table 2
Model transitions.
Transition Description Timing (seconds) Processor (Y/N)
1 Walk-in generation. Exponential(0.0033) N
2 Dispenser receives prescription. Uniform(30, 60) N
3 Allocate an available staff member to the counter. Deterministic(0) N
4 Delivery generation. Deterministic(3600) N
5 Allocate a worker to complete a primary task. Deterministc(0) N
6 Staff member chooses a prescription to begin working on. Uniform(5, 10) N
7 Label generation Deterministic(15) Y
8 Filling and applying labels. Normal(50, 10) Y
9 Pharmacist is allocated to complete secondary dispensing tasks. Deterministic(0) N
10 Pharmacist chooses a prescription, to begin completing secondary dispensing tasks. Uniform(10, 15) N
11 Pharmacist carries out a final accuracy check. Uniform(5, 10) Y
12 Pharmacist hands out prescription to patient, with counselling. Exponential(0.025) N
12 Pharmacist stores delivery prescription to be collected later. Exponential(0.05) N
13 Allocate pharmacist to complete an advanced service. Deterministic(0) N
14 Pharmacist completes an advanced service. Uniform(300, 600) N
15 Advanced service task generator. exponential(0.00006) N
16 Generate a stocking task to be completed. Deterministic(6600) N
17 Allocate a member of staff to complete a stock management task. Deterministic(0) N
18 Worker finishes a stock management task Uniform(300, 900) N
19 Begin triggering of lunch break for dispenser. Deterministic(7200) N
20 Allocate a dispenser to take a lunch break. Deterministic(0) N
21 Dispenser finished their lunch break. Deterministic(3600) N
22 Pharmacist moves to complete a primary dispensing task. Deterministic(10) N
Fig. 5. Primary tasks.
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priority is as follows: receiving prescriptions, lunch break, stock man-
agement and starting to dispense a prescription. Thus transition 3 is
given priority over transition 20, which is given priority over transition
17, which is given priority over transition 5. Receiving prescriptions is
the top priority, since patients waiting at the counter need to be seen
quickly. Lunch breaks and stock management are next, above starting
to dispense prescriptions, since these are infrequent compared to dis-
pensing, and these tasks may never be completed if dispensing were
prioritised, since the constant stream of dispensing would deny staff a
break.
3.3.4. Secondary task allocation
Fig. 6 shows the net section used to allocate pharmacists to sec-
ondary tasks. Similarly to the transitions used to allocate staff to pri-
mary dispensing tasks, the transitions for secondary tasks use a hier-
archy determined by their frequency. The hierarchy from highest to
lowest is as follows: advanced services, followed by completing sec-
ondary dispensing tasks.
3.3.5. Prescription modelling
Prescription tokens have 8 colours representing:
1. Delivery or a walk-in.
2. The time taken to dispense the prescription
3. Number of iterations to complete the prescription, if faults occur
4. The overall outcome of the prescription (near miss, dispensing error,
or completely correct)
5. The number of items in the prescription
6. Labels
7. Contents
8. Label application
The number of iterations is an integer, counting how many times a
prescription has needed to be corrected, whenever a pharmacist returns
a prescription after a near miss. Overall outcome is also an integer,
which represents the three possible outcomes of dispensing a pre-
scription. The colours for labels, contents and label application are
Boolean, and they indicate whether an error of the corresponding type
is present in the prescription.
There is no difference between a rectified near miss prescription and
a completely correct prescription being handed over to a patient, but in
this analysis, the number of near misses is an indicator of how well the
final accuracy check is performing, and how frequently errors occur
during the dispensing process.
3.3.6. Failures
The occurrence of failures is modelled in the CPN using Bernoulli
random variables. The processes of label generation, prescription as-
sembly and label application introduce a probability of a labelling
error, contents error, or label application error respectively. The failure
probabilities used for each stage can be found in Table 3. These prob-
abilities were taken from Cohen et al.[11]. It was then assumed that
label generation may be twice as likely to fail as applying completed
labels to prescription boxes.
The probability of errors is introduced to the CPN using arc in-
scriptions. The final accuracy check outcome is conditional on the state
of the prescription being checked. If a prescription is error free, it is
assumed that the prescription passes through the final accuracy check
to the next stage of the process.
If the prescription being checked contains an error, the pharmacist
attempts to spot the error at the final accuracy check. If an error is
spotted, the prescription is sent back to place 5 to be dispensed again. If
a prescription containing an error is checked, and the error is not found,
the erroneous prescription will continue through the dispensing pro-
cess.
3.3.7. Item modelling
Each prescription is assigned a random number of items, by sam-
pling from a Geometric(0.35) distribution. This distribution has a mean
of 1/0.35, and has been assumed, based on the following reasoning.
Assume a patient goes to a doctor and is given a prescription. The first
assumption is that there will be at least 1 item in the prescription. The
second assumption is that prescriptions containing more items are less
likely to occur than those containing fewer.
The number of items in a prescription affects the duration of some
stages of the dispensing process. To simulate this, transitions re-
presenting processor stages sample from their distribution a number of
times equal to the number of items in the prescription being processed,
and the sum of those samples is used as the delay.
3.4. Reviewing studies of dispensing errors
A review of the literature identified six studies which collected data
on dispensing errors and near misses in community pharmacies, with
one study in the US [23], three UK studies [4,10,24], one from Den-
mark [31] and one from Spain [50]. A UK study that only collected data
on the occurrence of dispensing errors, but no near-misses, has also
been included [24] in Table 4.
Table 4 gives the key information taken from each study. The col-
umns titled near misses and dispensing errors represent the percentage
of the total number of items (or prescriptions, depending on the study)
that were found to contain either type of error. The column entitled
“contents/labelling/administration” represents the percentage of each
type. Note that any errors that were neither content nor labelling errors
have been included in administration errors. The column of ”self-re-
port/external” indicates the type of data collection method used.
There was a large variation in the error rates found in the studies of
community pharmacies. Discrepancies include: the rate of near miss or
dispensing error occurrence per item or prescription dispensed, the
proportion of dispensing errors to near misses, and the relative pre-
valence of contents and labelling errors. Along with the differences
Fig. 6. Secondary tasks.
Table 3
Error Probability.
Task Description Probability (%)
1 Labelling 0.06
2 Filling 0.05
3 Label Application 0.03
4 Final Accuracy check 0.05
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found between studies, there were also reportedly variations of error
rates between pharmacies taking part in the same study, even when the
same data collection technique was being used.
As these studies do not state the exact specifics of the observed
pharmacies (size, number of staff, number of prescriptions, etc.) their
outputs cannot be used for the PN model validation. However, these
studies, taken as a group, give an indication of the range of values for
the near miss and dispensing error rates and can be used to comment on
the outputs of the PN model, as discussed in Section 4.1.1. The pro-
posed PN model has been verified by expert community pharmacists as
a reasonable representation of the core dispensing process in a com-
munity pharmacy.
4. Pharmacy scenarios and their analysis
To demonstrate the ability to simulate the effects on performance of
different community pharmacy variations, five scenarios were chosen
for analysis. Scenarios 1 and 2 investigate the effects of implementing
an infallible final accuracy check. Scenarios 3, 4 and 5 have been
chosen to demonstrate the effects of changing the make up of the
pharmacy team and the effects of non-dispensing activity. The number
of staff in these scenarios is chosen as a representation of small phar-
macies in the UK.
1. Scenario 1
Staff - 1 pharmacist, 2 dispensers
Failures - Probability of Failure in labelling, filling and label appli-
cation stages.
No Advanced Services, Lunch hours or Stocking.
2. Scenario 2
Staff - 1 pharmacist, 2 dispensers
Failures - Probability of Failure in labelling, filling and label appli-
cation stages, and final accuracy check.
No Advanced Services, Lunch hours or Stocking.
3. Scenario 3
Staff - 1 pharmacist, 2 dispensers
Failures - Probability of Failure in labelling, filling, label application
and final accuracy check stages.
Advanced Services - Included.
Lunch hours - 1 h off for each dispenser.
Stocking - Included.
4. Scenario 4
Same as scenario 3, but with 1 pharmacist and 3 dispensers.
5. Scenario 5
Same as scenario 3, but with 2 pharmacists and 2 dispensers.
Different initial conditions of the CPN are used to model each sce-
nario. Fig. 4 shows the CPN used in Scenario 3. The initial conditions of
other scenarios are created by adding or removing tokens, or altering
error rates. Adding additional dispenser tokens to place 6, or pharma-
cist tokens to place 16 alter the number of staff for Scenarios 4 and 5.
The tokens in places 19, 20 and 23 control whether any advanced
services, stocking, or lunch breaks are included in the simulation. Ad-
ditionally, to model an infallible accuracy check in Scenario 1, the
probability of 0 is used instead of 0.05 to describe the probability of
failure during an accuracy check.
4.1. Results and their analysis
An object oriented Coloured Petri Net simulation environment was
coded in C++, in which the CPN in Fig. 4 was constructed. A single
day of community pharmacy operation was simulated 150,000 times
for each scenario. The key results of the performance under the five
scenarios are shown in Table 5 (note that the sixth scenario, 3a, is
discussed in section 4.1.5). Further results on how members of staff
distributed their time between tasks are shown in Tables 6 and 7.
A convergence test was done on Scenario 3 to test whether 150,000
simulations was sufficient. This was done by running 900,000 simula-
tions of Scenario 3 for comparison with the original results. All results
are presented to the level of precision at which the two runs agreed.
Scenario 3 was chosen for the convergence test since it has many si-
milarities with all the other scenarios.
The values in Table 5 are generated by querying place 15, and
averaging over the set of simulations. The number of prescriptions
completed is counted, and the colours attached to each prescription
token are inspected to determine the number of prescriptions that were
Table 4
Summary of studies of dispensing errors and near misses in community pharmacies.
Study Type: Self- report/external Near misses (%) Dispensing errors (%) Items/prescriptions Contents/Labelling /Administration
1 [10] Self-report 0.48 0.08 Items 78.4 / 15.7 /5.9
2 [31] Self-report 0.024 0.014 Prescriptions 15.6 / 64.9 / 19.4
3 [24] External n/a 3.3 Items 51.5 / 48.5 / n/a
4 [4] Self-report 0.22 0.034 Items 62.9 / 33.5 / n/a
5 [23] Both 1.28 1.57 Prescriptions 35.2 / 58.2 /6.6
6 [50] Self-report 1.84 0.51 Prescriptions 31.4 / 68.6 / n/a
Table 5
Results: Task variations.
Scenario Efficiency Reliability
Deliveries complete % Total completed % Advanced services completed % Delayed % Waiting time (s) R Near Misses Dispensing errors
1 94.7 96.0 N/a 11.9 554 1 33.6 0
2 95.2 96.4 N/a 11.6 549 0.9923 32.0 1.9
3 78.3 86.3 98.3 17.6 621 0.9923 29.9 1.7
3a 79.6 87.1 98.3 15.9 600 0.9992 3.2 0.2
4 99.9 99.2 98.4 10.4 518 0.9923 32.2 1.9
5 100.0 99.3 98.4 5.6 443 0.9923 32.2 1.9
Table 6
Dispenser work sample.
Scenario Lunch (%) Idle (%) Primary (%) Receiving (%) Stocking (%)
1 0 15.6 78.0 6.4 0
2 0 15.9 77.7 6.4 0
3 12.5 13.5 67.1 6.1 0.8
4 12.5 25.3 57.0 4.7 0.6
5 12.5 26.0 55.8 5.1 0.6
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delayed, the average waiting time, the number of attempts it took to
dispense the prescription (near misses), and whether an error was
present when the prescription was complete (dispensing error). The
number of advanced services is equal to the number of basic tokens in
place 15.
Results in Tables 6 and 7 are generated by inspecting the colours
attached to each worker token in the PN, which keep track of how much
time each worker has spent completing each task. When a simulation
ends, the average time spent completing each activity is calculated for
each staff type (dispensers and pharmacists).
4.1.1. Scenario variations
Introducing additional non-dispensing demands on the pharmacy
increased the waiting time of prescriptions, as can be seen by com-
paring scenarios 2 and 3. Due to the priority given to walk-in pre-
scriptions over deliveries, there is a corresponding decrease in the
number of delivery prescriptions completed as additional non-dispen-
sing demands are considered.
A decrease in the average waiting time was seen when increasing
the number of staff. Having three dispensers instead of 2 (scenario 4)
reduced the average waiting time for walk-in prescriptions by 103 s. A
higher still decrease in the average waiting time was gained by adding a
second pharmacist to the team (scenario 5). This reduced the average
waiting time for walk-in prescriptions by 178 s. Notably, in both sce-
narios where 4 staff were used (scenarios 4 and 5), the pharmacy was
finishing a very high percentage of deliveries, over 99% in both sce-
narios. This suggests that 4 staff working in the pharmacy may have
been able to complete a higher number of delivery prescriptions in the
allotted time, increasing pharmacy productivity. This hypothesis is
backed up by Tables 6 and 7, where it can be seen that the staff were
idle considerably longer in scenarios 4 and 5.
The difference in the average dispense time between scenarios 1 and
2 is of note. The results show that including the potential for the final
accuracy check to fail, reduced the mean waiting time by 5 s. This is
expected, since a prescription containing an error will always be
identified if the final check is infallible (scenario 1), and thus it will be
sent to be dispensed again and therefore take longer. In scenario 2 a
small number of erroneous prescriptions which are not dispensed again
(due to them not being spotted at the final accuracy check) make the
process faster, but at the cost of dispensing errors reaching patients.
This result makes a strong case that, if it was possible to have an in-
fallible final accuracy check, the cost in terms of increased average
dispensing times would be low.
The results of the model indicate that the pharmacy dispensing
process had a reliability of 0.992, i.e. 99.2% of prescriptions were
dispensed correctly. Hence, the simulations produced a dispensing error
rate within the reported range seen in Table 4. On the other hand, the
frequency of near misses generated during simulations is considerably
higher than those reported in previous studies. The discrepancy may
relate to the fact that error probabilities in Table 4 for dispensing stages
may have been set too high, studies may be underestimating the true
rate of near misses, or the lack of specifics in the literature makes it
unsuitable for the validation of the proposed method. Studies on the
rate of near misses occurring in community pharmacies are often based
on self-report methodologies, which are known to under-report error
rates [22].
4.1.2. Work sampling comparison
Tables 6 and 7 show the percentage of time that was spent on each
task for dispensers and for pharmacists. Work sampling studies have
been conducted in community pharmacies, with the objective of de-
scribing how pharmacists spend their time [16,21,28,36]. These studies
are used to collect observations about a subject working in practice,
recording their activity at either fixed or randomly timed intervals. If
the set of observations is large enough, then the proportion of each
recorded activity can be approximated to the overall time spent on that
activity. It should be noted that different studies have returned a range
of results for how pharmacists spend their time. For example, con-
sidering the time pharmacists spend resting, the four studies cited
above returned results between 5.8%–18.1%. Such difference may be
attributable to the different work patterns, or variable levels of staff
present. Work patterns here, refer to the way tasks are divided up
within the pharmacy. In some pharmacies, the pharmacist may not
need to contribute to primary tasks, such as stock management or re-
ceiving prescriptions, whereas in others, they may have to.
For comparison Davies et al.[16] work sample is used as a bench-
mark for the model, as one of the more recent community pharmacy
work sampling studies. The results of the model compared well with the
work sample study on a number of fields, the time pharmacists spent on
patient counselling and advanced services were within 1% in multiple
scenarios. The largest discrepancy was the time spent accuracy
checking. In the model pharmacists spend almost 3 times the amount of
time checking than reported in the work sample study. This may be
because the model omits some activities. Davies et al.’s work sample
study has a number of activities which are not included in the model,
such as, housekeeping, staff training, sales transactions, which are all
not included in the model. Tables 6 and 7 both show that increasing the
number of staff gives staff much more idle time.
4.1.3. Distribution of waiting times
Fig. 7 shows the distributions of the waiting times for walk-in pre-
scriptions in scenarios 3, 4 and 5. Only these scenarios were considered
since they were sufficiently different from scenarios 1 and 2, where no
non-dispensing tasks are being completed. The waiting times for each
prescription were recorded during a separate run of 6000 simulations,
with each scenario totalling just over 600,000 prescriptions dispensed.
A prescription was considered to have been delayed if it took more than
15 min to be dispensed to a customer, denoted by the dashed line in
Fig. 7.
4.1.4. Causes of delays
There are a number of potential causes for delays. These include: a
prescription containing a large number of items being likely to take
longer due to the way multiple item prescriptions are handled in the
pharmacy, a prescription having to be repeated a number of times due
to near misses, or pharmacists being busy with non-dispensing tasks.
Table 8 shows the average properties of prescriptions completed in
different time periods, for scenarios 3, 4 and 5. It can be seen across
Table 7
Pharmacist work sample comparison.
Scenario Idle (%) Primary (%) Receiving (%) Advanced (%) Checking (%) Counselling (%) Storing (%) Stocking (%)
1 15.6 27.5 2.8 0 32.1 12.9 9.1 0
2 15.8 27.4 2.7 0 31.9 12.9 9.2 0
3 13.9 30.4 3.4 2.8 28.6 12.9 7.6 0.4
4 22.9 17.1 1.6 2.8 32.9 13.0 9.6 0.2
5 29.2 39.3 2.7 1.4 16.4 6.0 4.5 0.4
Work sample 8.6 25.2 N/a 3.2 10.6 12.4 N/a 3.4
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scenarios, that prescriptions being completed in increasingly delayed
time periods have, on average, a larger number of items and require
more iterations of dispensing to complete. As larger teams dispense
faster, the average number of items in the same band of duration in-
creases.
4.1.5. Intermediate check
A sixth pharmacy scenario (3a) was included in the analysis to test
the effect of implementing an intermediate accuracy check [41,55] in
the dispensing process, in addition to the final check. This check op-
erated in a similar manner to the final accuracy check, but by checking
prescriptions for errors while the labels were being applied, i.e. before
the prescription is passed to the pharmacist for the final check, and
returning them to be dispensed again if an error was found. The error
probability of the check was assumed to be 0.1. The results for this
scenario are shown in Table 5, the row 3a.
Introducing an intermediate check at this stage of the process had
relatively small effects on the pharmacies efficiency. It reduced the
waiting time by 21 s, increased the percentage of prescriptions dis-
pensed by 0.8%, and reduced the percentage of delayed prescriptions
by 1.7%. This could be due to the fact that when using an additional
intermediate check the errors are identified earlier and therefore the
prescription can be rectified and completed faster. However, it had
comparatively larger effects on process reliability. The additional check
increased reliability by 0.069, which in day to day terms meant 29
fewer near misses, and 1.7 fewer dispensing errors per day. Overall,
introduction of an intermediate check is a good option for increasing
process reliability and efficiency.
5. Conclusions
This paper demonstrated that Coloured Petri Nets is a viable method
for evaluating the reliability and efficiency of the community pharmacy
dispensing process. Pharmacy processes were simulated in order to
compare the performance under different team compositions. A set of
efficiency and reliability performance indicators were generated for
each scenario. The results indicate that adding an additional pharmacist
had a larger benefit for the process, in terms of process efficiency,
versus adding an additional dispenser, and that if an infallible method
of accuracy checking was achieved, the cost in terms of additional
dispensing times would be low. Introduction of an intermediate check
would increase process reliability without any loss in pharmacy effi-
ciency. Such a method could be used to inform pharmacy decisions on
the size of the team and areas of improvement for staff training.
Future work could include collection of in-field data to obtain task
durations and error probabilities, and carry out an investigation of how
these parameters are affected by factors, such as staff job role, age, level
of training, experience and motivation. Different dispensing paradigms
or conventions could be tested and compared within the modelling
framework, examples of which could be the inclusion of electronic
prescriptions, or the use of robotic dispensing technology. Finally, an
optimisation algorithm could be applied in order to find an optimal
make-up of the pharmacy team for improved process reliability and
efficiency.
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